Subjects exposed to strings of letters generated by a finite state grammar can later classify grammatical and nongrammatical test strings, even though they cannot adequately say what the rules of the grammar are (e.g., Reber, 1989). The MINERVA 2 (Hintzman, 1986) and Medin and Schaffer (1978) memory‐array models and a number of connectionist outoassociator models are tested against experimental data by deriving mainly parameter‐free predictions from the models of the rank order of classification difficulty of test strings. The importance of (...) different assumptions regarding the coding of features (How should the absence of a feature be coded? Should single letters or digrams be coded?), the learning rule used (Hebb rule vs. delta rule), and the connectivity (Should features be predicted only by previous features in the string, or by all features simultaneously?) is investigated by determining the performance of the models with and without each assumption. Only one class of connectionist model (the simultaneous delta rule) passes all the tests. It is shown that this class of model can be regarded by abstracting a set of representative but incomplete rules of the grammar. (shrink)

This anthology provides a collection of new essays on ethical and philosophical issues that concern the development, dispensing, and use of pharmaceuticals. It brings together critical ethical issues in pharmaceutics that have not been included in any collection (e.g., the ethics of patients as researchers). In addition, it includes philosophical issues that are not within the traditional domain of applied ethics. For example, a game-theoretic approach to combating the emergence of antibiotic-resistent pathogens by spreading altruism. A tripartite distinction provides an (...) organized series of discussions that shows the interrelatedness of philosophical issues from the creation of pharmaceuticals, the creation of demand for them, through their delivery to their ultimate consumption. (shrink)

Dienes & Perner argue that the explicit representation of an individual to which a property is attributed requires explicit representation of the attributed property. The reasons for this conclusion are similar to the reasons why another of their conclusions may be considered suspect: A property may be explicit without an explicit representation of an individual or the predication of the property to an individual. We question the latter conclusion and draw connections to neurophysiological and cognitive evidence.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hazel E. Barnes FLAUBERT AND SARTRE ON MADNESS IN KING LEAR T'oward the end of the second volume of The Family Idiot (L'Idiot de la famille), in a section called "Exercises and Reading," Sartre discusses Flaubert's reading of Shakespeare.1 In the context Sartre describes how Flaubert spent his time during one of the rare periods when he was not even attempting to write anything; more than two years elapsed (...) between the completion of the first Sentimental Education in January 1845 and die beginning of his collaboration widi Maxime Du Camp on La Bretagne. Along with doing desultory background reading for "an oriental tale," and analyzing the plays ofVoltaire, Flaubert claimed to be studying the Greek and Roman authors and a selected few of the later "great immortals." Sartre shows that Flaubert's way of reading them was entirely different from the critical analysis which he directed on the work of his contemporaries. Essentially it was a series of"rereadings," and its purpose was not to gain knowledge or even a fuller understanding of the text. In a letter to Mlle de Chantepie, Flaubert counsels her to take one of the great writers and "study him in depth," reading from beginning to end and then starting over again: "But do not read, as children read, to amuse yourself, nor as the ambitious read, to instruct yourself. No, read so as to live. Create in your soul an intellectual atmosphere which will be compounded from the emanation of all the great minds."2 How can Flaubert both counsel his correspondent to study in depdi and not to seek instruction? The kind ofstudy he has in mind, Sartre claims, is comparable to the way in which an amateur pianist might "study" Chopin, where die aim is not to understand analytically but to perfect a particular interpretation and to evoke a certain aesdietic reaction. Flaubert resists instruction because new knowledge risks forcing change. What he wants is 211 2 1 2 Philosophy and Literature to rediscover the same eternal truths and emotions.3 It is also to find inspiration for his own dreams, an oneiric reading. In this connection Sartre makes two important points. First, in striving to cultivate for the soul "an intellectual atmosphere... compounded from the emanation of all the great minds," the artist is adding so many strings to his lyre — the laugh of Rabelais, the cosmic passions of Shakespeare, the skepticism of Montaigne. This is whyJules at the end of die first Sentimental Education plans to study die great writers, beginning with Homer — not to learn dieir technique but to enlarge the artist's sensibility. Sartre's second point is made apropos of Flaubert's rereading of Shakespeare. Flaubert fluctuates between two responses. Sometimes he is depressed at the thought of his own lack of genius in comparison with Shakespeare. "That good man will drive me mad.... All odiers seem to me children beside him."* At odier times he experiences what Sartre calls a "glorifying identification." It is as though in imagination he becomes Shakespeare. In part this is because, as he writes in this same letter, we artists "breathe in our existence by means of die sentence." Sartre notes that for Flaubert the existence in question is a literary reality, not that of die everyday world; we may breathe it in either dirough writing or through reading. At this particular moment in his life, Sartre argues, Flaubert's program of study was in bad faith. He allowed die imaginary identification to suffice. Sartre goes so far as to say, "He reads in order not to write; in diis masturbatory substitute for the act, he makes himself an aumor all at once, under anodier name, in order not to work at becoming the writer of genius he wants to be." This comment makes sense if we recall Flaubert's situation in 1845-47. After the nervous crisis at Pont-L'Evêque he knew that either he would be a writer or he would remain a feeble invalid, an object of pity, the "family idiot." "There he is, dien, paralyzed by two opposing forces: hope and die fear of being disappointed " (p. 2021). No wonder he... (shrink)

Is the tonal ordering of music, and the order of European triadic tonality in particular, the developed manifestation of an essential musical structure—a structure naturally suited to our human capacity to organize sounds musically? Historically and geographically, triadic tonality is a highly local phenomenon, limited to music beginning in the mid-seventeenth century and, until the nineteenth century, almost wholly confined to the Western European musical tradition. Some theorists accordingly regard tonality as a dispensable aesthetic convention—and one which, moreover, has had (...) its day. For many listeners, however, works within this tradition possess a distinctive ability to embody musical movement and expression. This paper examines Roger Scruton's defense of tonality as developed in the European common practice period. I examine his reasons for supposing that tonality is an ineliminable feature of sounds heard and understood as music. Those reasons, I conclude, are inconclusive; on their own they do not show that tonality either will or should persist as an authoritative musical order. Triadic tonality has, at best, an uncertain future. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to Plato’s work that gives a clear statement of what Plato has to say about the problems of thought and life. In particular, it tells the reader just what Plato says, and makes no attempt to force a system on the Platonic text or to trim Plato’s works to suit contemporary philosophical tastes. The author also gives an account that has historical fidelity - we cannot really understand the Republic or the Gorgias if we forget (...) that the Athens of the conversations is meant to be the Athens of Nicias or Cleon, not the very different Athens of Plato’s own manhood. To understand Plato’s thought we must see it in the right historical perspective. (shrink)

Epitome V (1621), and consisted of matching an element of area to an element of time, where each was mathematically determined. His treatment of the area depended solely on the geometry of Euclid's Elements, involving only straight-line and circle propositions – so we have to account for his deliberate avoidance of the sophisticated conic-geometry associated with Apollonius. We show also how his proof could have been made watertight according to modern standards, using methods that lay entirely within his power. The (...) greatest innovation, however, occurred in Kepler's fresh formulation of the measure of time. We trace this concept in relation to early astronomy and conclude that Kepler's treatment unexpectedly entailed the assumption that time varied nonuniformly; meanwhile, a geometrical measure provided the independent variable. Even more surprisingly, this approach turns out to be entirely sound when assessed in present-day terms. Kepler himself attributed the cause of the motion of a single planet around the Sun to a set of `physical' suppositions which represented his religious as well as his Copernican convictions; and we have pared to a minimum – down to four – the number he actually required to achieve this. In the Appendix we use modern mathematics to emphasize the simplicity, both geometrical and kinematical, that objectively characterizes the Sun-focused ellipse as an orbit. Meanwhile we highlight the subjective simplicity of Kepler's own techniques (most of them extremely traditional, some newly created). These two approaches complement each other to account for his success. (shrink)

The poet’s words: “A man’s reach should exceed his grasp” are not merely a command of what ought to be , they are a description of what is. Man has always been stretching himself beyond his own measure. He has a sense of the Infinite: Eternity has been set in his heart: he has not been content to look only on the things seen, his gaze has ever been towards the Unseen. Whatever stage of development he may have reached, he (...) seeks for, and strives after, what is above and beyond himself and his world. In science he tries to get behind the phenomenal reality as his senses apprehend it, to the noumenal , mind. In philosophy he endeavours to bring the multiplicity of his experience, outer and inner, into a unity that will evidence itself to his reason as coherent, and not contradictory. In morality he is not content with the customs and standards of the society of which he is a member; but conscious of their inadequacy, he conceives and aspires to realize an ideal adequate to his nature; his ought to be is always challenging his is . The impulse or motive of progress in all spheres of human interest and activity is “the best is yet to be.”. (shrink)

This article attempts to map the broad ethical and legal contours of global child health realities. Its interest is in international duties to reduce disparities in the health of children. Specifically, it inquires into loci of collective rights and responsibilities in this context. Clarity on the sources of this responsibility and the nature of such rights will, it is hoped, contribute to enhanced and sustained action to attenuate these inequalities. A review and critique of the current topography of global health (...) ethics is followed by an analysis of international human rights law as it pertains to global health, with a particular focus on the legal dimensions of child health outcomes. Thus grounded, the article seeks to build conceptual synergies between public health ethics and human rights paradigms to underwrite collective action on global child health disparities. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

This paper explores the underrepresentation of women and minorities in academic philosophy. Specifically, it focuses on why, given the relatively even male/female ratio at undergraduate level, women are underrepresented at every level above this. It addresses some of the misconceptions and myths surrounding women in philosophy, including those surrounding the discussion of the different‐intuition hypothesis. It also explores the ways in which feminist research in philosophy is subject to marginalisation as a result of systematic exclusionary practices typical of the dominant (...) culture of justification within traditional philosophy. It argues for the necessity of an intersectional approach, and the importance of taking seriously the psychological and sociological analysis of underrepresentation, in order to improve both the experience and the representation of women and other minorities at all levels of professional philosophy, as well as of the discipline as a whole. (shrink)

This paper offers a new approach to the philosophical foundations of information systems through feminist philosophy and, in particular, feminist epistemology. This can be used to expose the universalizing tendency of many information systems and to show the importance of using real-life complex examples rather than the simplified examples often favored by philosophers. Within traditional epistemology and its relation to IS, subjectivity, the propositional/skills distinction and epistemic hierarchies are subject to arguments from feminist epistemology. With respect to the emerging critical (...) school of IS, feminist epistemology, and within that, feminist standpoint theory, are used to examine the complexities of the positivist/anti-positivist position and the related concept of emancipation. In addition, it is argued that the liberal version of emancipation encapsulated in such systems may have an effect opposite to that of emancipation These issues are illustrated in an existing expert systems project. (shrink)